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Abstract
Adversarial examples are maliciously modified inputs created
to fool deep neural networks (DNN). The discovery of such
inputs presents a major issue to the expansion of DNN-based
solutions. Many researchers have already contributed to the
topic, providing both cutting edge-attack techniques and var-
ious defensive strategies. In this work, we focus on the de-
velopment of a system capable of detecting adversarial sam-
ples by exploiting statistical information from the training-
set. Our detector computes several distorted replicas of the
test input, then collects the classifier’s prediction vectors to
build a meaningful signature for the detection task. Then,
the signature is projected onto the class-specific statistic vec-
tor to infer the input’s nature. The classification output of
the original input is used to select the class-statistic vector.
We show that our method reliably detects malicious inputs,
outperforming state-of-the-art approaches in various settings,
while being complementary to other defensive solutions.
The past decade has witnessed the definitive recognition of
Deep Learning (DL) algorithms as an efficient tool for tack-
ling a broad variety of tasks, notably image classification.
This machine learning technique has progressively found
application in diverse areas ranging from medical diagno-
sis (Esteva et al. 2017), through self-driving vehicles (Chen
et al. 2015) to virtual assistants (Prakash, Brockett, and
Agrawal 2016). Unfortunately, recent studies have proven
that such deep neural networks (DNN) are vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples (Szegedy et al. 2014; Nguyen, Yosinski,
and Clune 2015; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2017a):
malicious inputs designed to fool a DNN model by making
imperceptible modifications to pixel intensities.
This undermines the classification stability and poses a
great issue to the deployment of DNN-based systems, espe-
cially in safety-critical applications. An attacker, indeed, by
altering a traffic sign, might force a fully autonomous vehi-
cle to behave unexpectedly, putting human lives in danger.
Hence, finding a way to identify such adversarial samples
has become of paramount importance for twofold reasons:
make DL solutions more trustworthy and secure and enable,
at the same time, their massive deployment.
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Herein, we present a defensive solution which does not
affect the performance of the classification system nor con-
strain the training procedure. The design of an adversarial
detector represents one of the most promising solutions in
this direction: it allows to predict the nature of an input –
malicious or legitimate – and decide whether to reject or
maintain the outcome of the defended classifier. In addition,
this type of defensive strategy can be considered as an exter-
nal, separate module, which could be turned on only when
the environment is prone to malicious instances.
We propose to combine the robustness of DNNs to
greedy image distortions with statistical information from
the training-set to build an effective detection framework.
We show that distorted adversarial examples have different
underlying statistics than their legitimate counterparts. This
allows us to build some orthogonality between malicious
samples and statistics from the legitimate training-set. Fi-
nally, we take advantage of this property to reliably detect
them.
Our work provides the following contributions:
• We develop a low-cost, effective adversarial detector able
to reliably recognize and discard malicious inputs in both
white and black-box settings.
• We provide a proof of the compatibility property with
other defensive technique, such as adversarial training.
• We devise a brand new distortion, enabling the adversarial
detection task.
1 Background and Related Works
Over the years, the development of numerous machine learn-
ing (ML) frameworks along with the availability of vast
amounts of data have made the task of training DNNs quite
simple. Despite this, researchers have only scratched the sur-
face of such networks, which are still treated as black-box
entities. The possibility to unveil hidden properties and be-
haviors of DNNs has started a real arms-race. Since the dis-
covery of adversarial examples, an ever-increasing number
of researchers attempted to design new, more powerful at-
tacks capable of defeating the current state-of-the-art de-
fense. In this section we describe some of the most important
attacks and defensive strategies present in the literature.
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1.1 Adversarial Attacks
The development of an attack method requires profound
knowledge of intrinsic properties of DNN systems. Adver-
sarial examples are, indeed, the result of an optimization
algorithm over the input domain and the possibility to fine
tuning such optimization procedure opens up to a variety of
different scenarios.
Formally, it is possible to define the task of generating a
malicious input x′ out of a legitimate input x as the act of
finding the perturbation η such that,
x′ = x+ η (1)
leads to a different classification result. The perturbation η
is generally the result of an optimization algorithm.
The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) attack was orig-
inally designed to speed-up the generation process (Good-
fellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015). It does so by performing
a single step along the direction of the gradients w.r.t. the
loss function calculated on a generic clean input. Equation
(2) shows the computation of the perturbation, where l is the
ground-truth label associated with input x and L(x, l) repre-
sents the loss function. The magnitude of the step is the same
for every pixel and is controlled by the step-size parameter
.
η =  · sign(∇xL(x, l)) (2)
FGSM is one of the earlier attack techniques ever devel-
oped. It is very fast compared to other methods but produces
more aggressive perturbations, i.e., the malicious inputs are
mostly visible to the human eye. However, it is interesting
to notice how a very greedy technique can effectively under-
mine the stability of a neural network. This is also confirmed
by the manifold variants which succeeded FGSM, attempt-
ing to improve the efficiency of the method (Kurakin, Good-
fellow, and Bengio 2017a; Rozsa, Rudd, and Boult 2016;
Trame`r et al. 2018; Dong et al. 2018; Kurakin, Goodfellow,
and Bengio 2017b).
Other authors tried to refine the algorithm to achieve
the smallest adversarial perturbation (in terms of magni-
tude). Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi,
and Frossard 2016) believed that the geometrical represen-
tation of DNN models represents a powerful tool for under-
standing the nature of such malicious samples. They lever-
aged the hyperplane theory to represent the decision bound-
aries imposed by a network in the high-dimensional in-
put domain. Finally, they created DeepFool (DF), an iter-
ative procedure to achieve the smallest perturbation mov-
ing a natural input just beyond its closest decision boundary.
Compared with FGSM, it produces much finer perturbation
masks, at the expense of higher computational time. More-
over, since it pushes the input just beyond the closest de-
cision boundary, it does not allow to accurately control the
effectiveness of the attack – sometimes it results in uncer-
tain malicious samples because of their close proximity to
the decision boundary.
Carlini and Wagner (Carlini and Wagner 2017) pre-
sented an effective attack technique to be used as bench-
mark against new attacks/defenses. They mathematically ap-
proached the adversarial generation process, providing new
ways to address the optimization problem. The resulting at-
tack method is an iterative process named after its inventors
Carlini&Wagner (C&W). Compared to DF it has the advan-
tage of providing the attacker with several hyper-parameters
to tune in order to achieve adversarial samples with a broad
variety of properties. C&W is actually considered the state-
of-the-art attack techniques, as confirmed by the broad vari-
ety of works present in literature (Xu, Evans, and Qi 2018;
Meng and Chen 2017; Chen et al. 2017).
Finally, it is worth introducing the definition of two com-
mon attack settings: white-box and black-box. The former
accounts for an attacker which has full access to the clas-
sifier, including the backpropagation signal, while the lat-
ter assumes that the attacker does not have access to the at-
tacked model.
1.2 Defensive Strategies
The ability of reliably defend against adversarial inputs is
of paramount importance to enable massive deployment of
DNN-based solutions, especially in sensitive areas. Over the
years, researchers have developed various approaches which
can be divided in two main families: proactive and reactive.
Strategies of the former type aim at making the defended
network more robust during the design and/or training pro-
cess whilst approaches from the latter family are deployed
after the classifier has already been trained, i.e. without tem-
pering the design/training process.
Some researchers believe that learning from adversarial
examples would increase DNNs robustness without signifi-
cantly harming the performance. Goodfellow et al. (Good-
fellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015) proposed to introduce a
factor accounting for adversarial examples in the loss func-
tion used during training. Adversarial training of a network
is a proactive solution: it requires to generate malicious in-
puts live – for the current learned network configuration –
and uses the loss produced to perform the next optimization
step. In this way, one can increase the model’s generaliza-
tion power to adversarially manipulated inputs. This tech-
nique has proven to successfully increase robustness at the
expense of increased training time. In addition, another de-
sired property conferred by adversarial training is the bet-
ter generalization power, as reported in (Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy 2015) and (Huang et al. 2015).
Xu et al. (Xu, Evans, and Qi 2018) instead, realized that
it is possible to lower the degree of freedom available to an
attacker by reducing the input space dimensionality. They
proposed to detect malicious samples by using distortions
to squeeze the pixel domain. The resulting system, named
Feature Squeezing (FS), acts as a reactive defense: when the
classifier receives a generic input, it computes the squeezed
version and compares the classifier outcomes of both origi-
nal and squeezed input. Then, a thresholding operation de-
cides whether the input is adversarial or legitimate. FS pos-
sesses the advantages of being a low-cost attack-agnostic
technique, which affects neither the model architecture nor
the training procedure. On the other hand, it requires to
query the classifier multiple times, thus resulting in higher
inference time.
Liao et al. (Liao et al. 2018) considered the possibility to
Figure 1: Framework of the proposed detection scheme. Several distorted replicas of the original input are computed. The
prediction vectors on every input replica are collected to build a signature. The classification output on the original input is used
to select the per-class first-order statistic. The normalized projection score is thresholded to infer the input nature.
reconstruct the original, legitimate input from an adversarial
one. They proposed to clean the classifier’s input by means
of a data-driven pre-processing entity. The devised denoiser
was trained exploiting information from higher levels of the
defended network, hence named High-level representation
Guided Denoiser (HGD). The authors showed that their pro-
posal efficiently solves the adversarial issue with good trans-
ferability properties. Unfortunately, when deployed along
with the classifier, it creates a new DL system which is very
prone to be attacked in white-box settings. Moreover it is not
attack agnostic since it requires adversarial samples to train
the Denoiser.
2 Our Method
In this section, we provide a description of our defense ap-
proach. We believe that the deployment of an adversarial ex-
amples detector represents the most interesting solution to
defend DNN models. Indeed, this external module does not
affect the classifier’s performance and can be activated only
when required. Therefore, we designed a detector that ex-
ploits the robustness of DNN models to greedy distortions.
As in (Xu, Evans, and Qi 2018), we first noticed that af-
ter being distorted, adversarial examples manifest different
statistics than legitimate ones. Since it is well-known that
DNNs are invariant to several distortions, we thought that it
could be possible to exploit such distortions to build a mean-
ingful signature for the detection task. In our work we pro-
pose to concatenate the probability vectors outputted by the
classifier when queried with the distorted replicas of the re-
ceived input.
The extracted signature is then compared with a refer-
ence vector in order to assess the input nature. We decided
to use class-representative vectors: in particular, per-class
first order statistics, so that legitimate samples belonging
to a given class must exhibit statistics similar to the class-
representative vector. The reference vectors are computed
on the same set used to train the network: the detector ex-
tracts the signature vector for every training sample and
then averages across samples from the same class. Equa-
tion (3) contains the formal definition of the described pro-
cedure, where f(x) is the function learned by the network,
Ψ = {ψi : i = 1, . . . ,m} the set of distortions used, g(·,Ψ)
the function building the signature, |·| the dimensionality op-
erator returning the number of samples in the set, n and m
the total number of classes and distortions, respectively.
µj =
1
|Xj |
∑
x∈Xj
g (f(x),Ψ) ∀ j = 1, . . . , n (3)
We use the class predicted on the original input to select
the class-specific vector. Fig. 1 shows the framework of the
detector described.
The scheme described so far forced adversarial examples
to produce signatures which are orthogonal to the corre-
sponding reference vector (for proper choice of the distor-
tions). This discovery led us to choose the normalized pro-
jection score (a.k.a. cosine similarity) as metric in the com-
parison, hence quantifying the similarity among signature
and class-representative statistics. Equation (4) formally de-
fines the computation, where j = arg max f(x) is the pre-
dicted class for the original input, ‖·‖2 is the L2–norm and
γ(x)
M
= g (f(x),Ψ) for brevity – the function building the
signature in Eq. (3). Technically, it computes the cosine of
the angle between the two vectors under comparison.
proj(x) =
γ(x)Tµj
‖γ(x)‖2 · ‖µj‖2 (4)
The higher the score is, the more aligned the two vectors are,
the more likely is the input to be legitimate.
Fig. 2 contains the histogram produced by our detector
on the GTSRB dataset (Stallkamp et al. 2011). Legitimate
samples get scores close to 1, whilst adversarial ones are
almost all close to be orthogonal. It proves the validity of
our detection scheme.
Legitimate White-box Black-box
Metrics Samples C&W C&W5 C&W9 DF FGSM1 FGSM4 C&W DF FGSM4
C
IF
A
R
10
Accuracy (victim) 76.83 13.32 13.21 13.21 13.97 21.08 12.66 75.68 75.63 38.50
Avg. Prediction
84.14 44.86 55.79 63.88 44.58 74.83 78.87 59.30 59.31 65.39
Confidence (victim)
Accuracy (substitute) 79.11 — — — — — — 11.80 12.84 11.89
G
T
SR
B
Accuracy (victim) 92.88 3.66 3.66 3.64 3.52 42.19 20.58 92.71 92.66 78.97
Avg. Prediction
96.88 51.55 63.17 71.41 48.45 83.90 91.58 63.58 63.35 66.95
Confidence (victim)
Accuracy (substitute) 96.72 — — — — — — 1.72 2.03 20.47
Table 1: Performance of the tested models against every test-set. Accuracies and average prediction confidences are reported
(in percentage, %) for both legitimate and adversarial test-sets when no adversarial defense is deployed.
Figure 2: Histogram plotting the distribution the score ex-
tracted by the proposed detector for legitimate (blue) and
adversarial (orange) samples. Inputs were sampled from the
GTSRB test-set and perturbed using the C&W method. The
detector used a single distortion: median filtering. The sepa-
ration among the two different class is very neat.
Before delving into the results section, it is worth dis-
cussing the distortions used in our work. In order to enable
fair comparison with previous works, we borrowed some of
the distortions from (Xu, Evans, and Qi 2018), namely me-
dian filtering and bit-depth reduction. The former consists of
a simple spatial smoothing operation, replacing the pixel in-
tensities with the median value of their neighbors, whilst the
latter re-quantizes the intensity values with a reduced num-
ber of bits – common camera sensors acquire images with
8-bit resolution pixel intensities per channel. In addition, it
was devised a new distortion which converts RGB images
to the corresponding gray-scale version. In order to main-
tain the model’s information flow, the distortion rearranges
the input as expected by the classifier: several copies of the
single channel, gray-scale image are stacked on top of each
other to generate a 3 channel input.1
We will refer to the described distortion as gray-scale.
1The distortion was tested only on the RGB color-space repre-
sentations.
3 Results
In this section we describe the experimental setup used and
report the results of the experiments carried out.
Our proposal was tested against two different datasets:
GTSRB (Stallkamp et al. 2011) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky
2009). The former contains a collection of 43 traffic signs
organized in 40k training and 13k test samples circa. The
samples come in an RGB format with different shapes. Ev-
ery image is resized to 46x46x3 before feeding the classifier.
The latter consists of 10 different classes and provides 50k
training and 10k test samples. The images come in an RGB
format of shape 32x32x3.
A critical point during the evaluation of any defensive
strategy is the selection of the attack methods. In this work
we decided to focus on three different attacks for different
reasons:
• DF represents a very strong technique, able to generate
adversarial inputs with imperceptible perturbations.
• C&W is the current state-of-the-art attack for benchmark-
ing new defenses; beyond producing invisible perturba-
tions, it allows the attacker to control the effectiveness of
the attack through the customizable parameter κ.
• FGSM produces very aggressive perturbations, some-
times visible to humans; however, it is of interest to study
the detector behavior against such kind of malicious in-
puts.
The adversarial sets were generated in both white and black-
box attack settings (crafted from a substitute model trained
on the same dataset). Table 1 reports the performance of the
trained models on both legitimate and adversarial test-sets.
The number beside C&W specifies the value of the parame-
ter κ – e.g. C&W9 has κ = 0.9 – while the number beside
FGSM stresses out the magnitude of the step size parameter
 – e.g. FGSM1 has  = 0.01. The substitute models were
devised to have more capacity than the relative victim.
In terms of results, we compare our method with Feature
Squeezing (FS) which represents the closest state-of-the-art
solution (Xu, Evans, and Qi 2018). Indeed, it shares with
our method the properties of being a low-cost, model-free
technique, thus enabling a fair comparison.
For each experiment, it was chosen to extract the detection
ROC curves and provide the comparison as AUC score in or-
der to be independent to the threshold level. The ROC curves
were computed pairing the attack-set with an equal number
of correctly predicted samples from the original test-set.
Unless otherwise stated, every detector was tested using
both the distortions found in literature, namely median fil-
tering and bit-depth reduction.
3.1 White-box Results
Fig. 3 shows the ROC curves for both FS and our detectors
on the CIFAR10 dataset. The improvement introduced by
our method is very clear, passing closer to the top-left corner
and demonstrating a more convergent behavior.
Table 2, reports the AUC scores produced for all the
white-box attack-sets. It confirms that our detector outper-
forms FS on the strongest attack-sets, i.e. C&W and DF,
whilst FS is able to perform as well as our method (or better)
when tested against the FGSM attacks. However, the latter
aspect does not represent a serious issue, as shown in section
3.2.
Furthermore, bearing table 1 in mind, it is interesting to
see how the effectiveness of FS significantly drops when the
classifier to defend comes with more uncertainty (i.e. CI-
Figure 3: ROC curves of our (blue) and FS (orange) detector
against the C&W attack on the CIFAR10 test-set. Both the
detectors use median filtering and reduction of the bit-depth
as distortions.
Meth. CW CW5 CW9 DF FGSM1 FGSM4
C
IF
A
R
10 FS 82.34 86.62 89.45 82.21 88.89 74.90
Ours 96.58 95.57 95.31 97.00 84.17 67.52
G
T
SR
B FS 96.55 97.76 98.39 96.16 93.74 73.60
Ours 99.77 99.69 99.61 99.62 92.54 74.08
Table 2: AUC scores of FS and our detector against every
attack-set. All results are reported in percentage (%).
FAR10 model), thus suggesting that our detector is more ro-
bust to changes in performance of the defended model.
3.2 Compatibility with Adversarial Training
The previous subsection showed that our detector is highly
effective against attacks which produce fine perturbations.
Simultaneously, it showed a lack of efficiency in detecting
more aggressive attacks. Luckily, the literature is full of so-
lutions capable to tackle such malicious inputs.
In this section we compare the performance of FS and our
detector when deployed along with another defensive strat-
egy: adversarial training (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2015). In more details, the classifier to defend was fine
trained for a few epochs, substituting half of the samples
in the mini-batch with the corresponding FGSM4 adversar-
ial version against the current network configuration. Every
adversarial attack-set was then computed again on the final,
adversarially trained version of the network.
Table 3 contains the performance of the models with and
without adversarial training. As expected, the results are sig-
nificantly more robust to FGSM attacks, suggesting that the
network learned the heavy pattern of the adversarial pertur-
bations. On the other hand, we notice a drawback in the clas-
sifier’s performance, manifesting a slight drop in accuracy.
Fine tuning the adversarial training process allows the pre-
vention of this effect.
Table 4 reports the AUC scores produced by both FS and
our detector deployed with and without adversarial training.
We notice that adversarially training the classifier helps the
detection task, especially on the FGSM attack-sets. More-
Metric Legit. C&W DF FGSM1 FGSM4
C
IF
A
R
10
Accuracy w/o
76.83 13.32 13.97 21.08 12.66
adv. training
Accuracy w.
73.58 14.18 14.29 46.65 28.16
adv. training
G
T
SR
B
Accuracy w/o
92.88 3.66 3.52 42.19 20.58
adv. training
Accuracy w.
91.95 4.31 4.22 73.49 31.80
adv. training
Table 3: Accuracies of the models before and after adversar-
ial training. All results are reported in percentage (%).
Method Adv. Train C&W DF FGSM1 FGSM4
C
IF
A
R
10 FS
w/o 82.34 82.21 88.89 74.90
w. 81.40 80.73 79.81 72.50
Ours
w/o 96.58 97.00 84.17 67.52
w. 96.65 96.73 86.48 78.41
G
T
SR
B FS
w/o 96.55 96.16 93.74 73.60
w. 88.39 88.61 92.20 89.45
Ours
w/o 99.77 99.62 92.54 74.08
w. 93.26 93.26 95.77 92.81
Table 4: AUC scores of FS and our detector without and with
adversarial training. All results are in percentage (%).
over, the results shows that our approach comes with bet-
ter compatibility property than FS, benefiting the most from
adversarial training. Last but not the least, it is important to
consider the slight accuracy drop of the adversarially trained
networks during our analysis, because it accounts for poorer
results against both C&W and DF attack-set – as shown in
section 3.1.
3.3 Distortions Configuration
In this section we provide an analysis of the detector be-
havior using different configuration of distortions. We tested
both FS and our detectors with a single distortion (using
those introduced in section 2), two distortions and all three
distortions.
The results are presented in table 5. It is clear that our de-
tector benefits from the use of several distortions: the config-
urations which use multiple distortions nearly always obtain
the best scores. The same does not hold for FS, achieving
its peak performance when the single-distortion settings are
adopted. These insights suggest that the detector developed
is able to build a meaningful signature for the detection task,
hence combining the effect of multiple distortions in a better
way than FS does.
Focusing on the single-distortion configurations, we no-
tice the new gray-scale distortion to perform nicely, outper-
forming the bit-depth reduction on the FGSM4 attack-set.
This proves that it represents a valid distortion, especially
when used in multiple-distortions configurations. Finally,
we find that the effectiveness of each distortion is problem-
dependent, as certifies the different results achieved on CI-
FAR10 and GTSRB datasets.
3.4 Black-box Results
The much lower number of samples which succesfully fool
the models in black-box settings does not allow us to use the
AUC scores as performance quantifiers. Thus, according to
(Xu, Evans, and Qi 2018), we decided to set the threshold
C&W DF FGSM4
Distortions FS Ours FS Ours FS Ours
C
IF
A
R
10
Median 80.69 93.68 80.73 93.72 76.15 69.01
Bit-depth 87.96 94.41 86.84 94.71 52.64 56.83
Gray-scale 75.16 88.85 74.62 88.32 65.09 65.76
2 dist. 82.34 96.58 82.21 97.00 74.90 67.52
3 dist. 75.63 96.79 75.37 97.08 73.88 72.50
G
T
SR
B
Median 97.86 99.51 97.63 99.46 74.95 75.63
Bit-depth 97.00 99.05 96.19 97.36 61.75 66.95
Gray-scale 91.35 96.98 90.84 96.60 77.19 73.84
2 dist. 96.55 99.77 96.16 99.62 73.60 74.08
3 dist. 89.98 99.81 89.31 99.72 76.08 73.67
Table 5: AUC scores of FS and our detector for different
choices of the distortions. The configuration with two dis-
tortions uses median filtering and bit-depth reduction. All
results are reported in percentage (%).
Method Threshold Legitim. C&W DF FGSM4
C
IF
A
R
10 FS 1.2119 95.42 7.68 7.58 25.83
Ours 0.6894 94.59 22.82 23.06 31.27
G
T
SR
B FS 0.4097 90.13 69.27 70.15 68.51
Ours 0.9739 89.59 78.28 77.59 72.95
Table 6: Detection rates of FS and our detector in black-box
settings. All results are reported in percentage (%).
such that it rejects only 5% of the legitimate test samples
and collect the detection rates. Table 6 reports the results. It
is clear that our detector outperforms FS even in black-box
settings. We believe that the use of per-class statistics pro-
vides the main contribution in this setting, forcing the refer-
ence vector to be well-shaped, regardless of the effectiveness
of the malicious input.
4 Conclusions
The approach devised results in a cost-effective, reliable de-
tector showing an impressive ability to identify adversarial
samples. Compared to FS,our method:
• performs better on a broad variety of classifiers.
• is more compatible with other defensive techniques such
as adversarial training.
• combines in a better way the effects coming from multiple
distortions.
• performs better in both white and black-box settings.
Despite the experiments and the development presented in
this work, there are multiple directions for further improve-
ment.
As suggested in section 3.2, it would be interesting to ex-
plore the parameter space of the adversarial training defen-
sive technique, finding out the configuration which benefits
the most from our detector. Furthermore, it would be intrigu-
ing to see how the proposed detector reacts when combined
with other defensive strategies.
Another promising work direction consists of merging
various distortions to be used as a single one (using less ag-
gressive settings), achieving a distortion able to deal with
most of the attack techniques. This would reduce the number
of queries to the model, thus reducing the overall inference
time.
Finally, we think that the normalized projection score
might be used directly as an indicator of the input nature
(it is close to 0 for adversarial samples, whilst close to 1 for
legitimate ones), thus multiplying directly the classification
output rather than undergoing a thresholding operation.
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